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Disintegration, Modularity and entry mode choice:  
Mirroring technical and organizational architectures in business functions offshoring  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We study the relationship between modularity and entry mode choice in the context of business 
functions offshoring. We define the degree of modularity of an activity as technical architecture 
(whether it can be detached from the rest of the value chain without loss of synergies). We refer to 
the entry mode chosen as organizational architecture (whether a captive solution, a partnership or 
outsourcing). We propose that the selection of entry mode should reflect the alignment of the 
technical and organizational architectures: that is, they need to be ‘mirrored’. Modular activities are 
more likely to be outsourced, as modularity decreases transaction costs and knowledge leakages 
risks, while not-modular activities reflect captive entry modes. Based on the analysis of 486 
business function offshoring initiatives, we also argue that firms can “break” the mirror as the entry 
choice is contingent upon the level of disintegration of the value chain and the offshoring 
experience of the firms.  
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Introduction 
The offshoring of business functions is a growing trend where firms globally source white-
collar work, including R&D, technical and administrative activities (Lewin and Peeters, 2006; 
Kenney, Massini and Murtha, 2009; Albertoni and Elia, 2014, Anderson and Pereira 2017, Pereira, 
Munjal and Ishizaka 2017). Improvements in information and communication technologies have 
dramatically decreased the transaction and coordination costs of managing cross-border activities, 
thus enabling firms to fragment and disintegrate their value chain across countries in order to access 
specific resources such as qualified personnel, knowledge and new technologies (Manning, Massini 
and Lewin, 2008; Lewin, Massini and Peeters, 2009; Elia, Caniato, Luzzini and Piscitello, 2014; 
Gooris and Peeters, 2016).  
However, although fragmenting a value chain may seem straightforward in principle, 
disintegration is not so simple in practice (Baldwin & Clark, 1997; Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005; 
Kotabe, Parente & Murray, 2007; Langlois & Robertson, 1992; Parente, Baack & Hahn, 2011). 
Indeed, the extent to which a firm can decrease transaction and coordination costs, knowledge 
leakages risks and operational efforts associated with value chain disintegration depends also on the 
level of independence among its components, i.e. the modularity of its architecture (Cabigiosu and 
Camuffo, 2012). 
The notion of modularity has been increasingly discussed in the innovation and management 
literature (Baldwin & Clark, 1997, 2000 and 2006; Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001; Brusoni, Prencipe & 
Pavitt, 2001; Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012; Furlan, Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2014; Langlois, 2002; 
Langlois & Robertson, 1992; Lew, Sinkovics, Yamin and Khan, 2016).  Modularity refers to the 
partitioning a product or a system into discrete, independent and self-contained modules, without 
any loss of synergies and complementarities among the individual components (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001; Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010). Specifically, this literature 
distinguishes between modularity at two levels. First, at the level of the product, i.e., modularity as 
a property, or component modularity, that is to say the modularity of the technical architecture. Not 
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all products are easily divided into sub-units: systems that are highly interdependent are difficult to 
‘slice’ into distinct modules. Second, there is also modularity at the organizational level. 
Organizational modularity refers to the extent to which the tasks are implemented across 
administrative units within an organization (MacDuffie, 2013; Furlan, Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 
2014).  For instance, in a packaging company, the sales unit is relatively easy to separate 
organizationally from manufacturing, while marketing and product development are highly 
interdependent, and organizationally these activities are best undertaken by an integrated team.  
Scholars have argued that, from a conceptual point of view, these two dimensions of 
modularity are related, in that the organizational architecture of a project should reflect its technical 
architecture (and vice-versa) – the so-called “mirroring hypothesis” (Colfer & Baldwin, 2016).  
Activities that are highly integrated, i.e. that require constant and intense communication between 
specialists or that involve a fairly high degree of tacit knowledge, are more difficult to ‘slice’ from 
an organizational perspective. That is, they require considerable and intense interaction between 
organizational units and are more difficult to organizationally modularise.  Activities characterised 
by modular technical architecture, i.e. that do not require constant interaction or that are fairly easily 
codified, can be designed more efficiently by modular organizations, and can in principle be 
undertaken by separated organizations (Narula 2001; Brusoni, 2005).  Offshoring requires an 
alignment of organizational and technical architecture, since each type of architecture ‘reflects’ the 
modularity of the other.  
In our paper, we intend to explain what are the dynamics associated with the decision of when 
to offshore, and how this is most effectively achieved, in the context of business services offshoring.  
Utilising the mirroring hypothesis, we focus on whether an activity being offshored should be 
organized internally within a firm, or alternatively, should be organized outside the boundaries of 
the firm (that is, outsourced).  
The choice between internalization or externalization (outsourcing) decisions corresponds to 
the entry mode choice in the international business literature, which is probably the most 
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extensively studied and debated decision that MNCs make when offshoring (Hätönen and Eriksson, 
2009; Pereira and Malik, 2015).  However, there is still need for further analysis on the reasons why 
firms choose to ‘buy’ instead of ‘make’, by taking into account the interdependencies within the 
value chain (Brouthers, 2013; Hennart and Slangen, 2014). Our paper addresses this lacuna by 
inquiring: under what conditions is it possible to apply the mirroring hypothesis to explain the entry 
mode choice of firms disintegrating their value chain through business function offshoring?   
We bridge the modularity and mirroring hypothesis literature with the international business 
literature and, in doing so, provide a contribution to both the mirroring hypothesis and the 
international business literature.  Specifically, we argue that the make-or-buy choice can be 
conceived as a decision of the extent to which a firm decides to align the technical architecture of an 
activity (which in turn depends on its modularity) with the organizational architecture of the 
offshoring initiative involving that activity. In order to support this perspective, we draw from both 
Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985) and the Resource Based View and Knowledge 
Based Theory (see, for instance, Barney, 1991; Marengo & Dosi, 2005; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004), 
which both suggest that interdependent (i.e., not modular) activities should be organized within a 
single firm rather than across firms. In doing so, they implicitly point to the need to design the 
organizational architecture of an activity according to its technical architecture. For instance, an 
external (outsourcing) solution is more appropriate in the case of a modular activity because it is 
less affected by transaction costs and knowledge leakages risks. Hence, consistent with the 
mirroring hypothesis (Baldwin, 2008; Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Langlois, 2002; Teece, 1996), we 
argue that business functions that present a modular technical architecture (i.e. a low risk of loss of 
synergies in case of offshoring) will show higher probability to select a governance mode based on 
an outsourcing solution.  
We develop this argument further and propose that the extent to which companies comply with 
the mirroring hypothesis is contingent upon the level of disintegration of their value chain. 
Specifically, we distinguish the traditional separation of the value chain among different business 
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functions from a more intensive level of disintegration, i.e. the “functional fine-slicing”, which 
refers to the possibility of subdividing each business function into smaller, possibly less complex 
and more homogenous tasks. We claim that the reintegration costs (i.e. the efforts required to 
reintegrate the modules into the system) are potentially lower when the company offshores single 
tasks of a function rather than the whole function. Indeed, in the former case, the firm will have to 
reintegrate single activities which share a common platform (in terms of routines, managerial 
practices etc.) as they belong to the same function, while in the latter case, the firm will have to 
reconnect the offshore function with the inshore functions, thus reconciling different and 
heterogeneous platforms. As a consequence, the mirroring hypothesis is more likely to hold when 
the disintegration of the value chain occurs with – rather than without - functional fine-slicing. 
Finally, we propose that the mirroring hypothesis in the entry mode choice is contingent also on 
firms’ experience. Companies with previous offshoring experience are likely to have already 
experienced the challenges arising from a mismatch between the two.  
We test our conjectures on data from 486 offshoring initiatives provided by the Offshoring 
Research Network (ORN). Our analysis supports the mirroring hypothesis, suggesting that modular 
(non-modular) activities are more likely to be offshored through an outsourcing (captive) solution, 
especially in case of functional fine-slicing and when firms are experienced.  
 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
 
Technical and organizational modularity in business functions  
The relocation of business activities to offshore locations involves the reconfiguration of 
some activities in the value chain that are currently performed domestically. Disintegration is easier 
in the case of modular products and systems, i.e., when it is possible to partition a product or a 
system into discrete and self-contained modules. Partitioning an activity is strictly related to the 
ability of the firm to fragment, “mix and match”, and recompose the knowledge that is needed for 
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that activity, without losing critical information (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001). In other words, 
modularization requires the knowledge boundaries of the firm to stretch beyond its production 
boundaries (Asmussen, Larsen & Pedersen, 2016). In fact, even if an activity is fragmented into 
smaller components, each associated to specialized knowledge, the firm must be able to act as a 
system integrator by orchestrating the network of modules, recomposing the knowledge modules 
and guaranteeing the overall consistency of the product/service (Brusoni, 2005; Brusoni & 
Prencipe, 2001; Brusoni, Prencipe & Pavitt, 2001; Cantwell & Santangelo, 2000). This task 
becomes particularly challenging when the individual components require a high degree of 
interconnectivity across a number of people, sectors, technologies and products (Granstrand, Patel 
& Pavitt, 1997), i.e. when they need frequent connections such as regular, efficient and intensive 
knowledge flows, e.g. through systematic face-to-face meetings among scientists, engineers and 
managers in different units (Narula, 2014). Therefore, the modularity of an activity depends on the 
extent to which the single modules are independent, relatively generic, and not co-specialized, i.e. 
they can be separated without loss of synergies and complementarities.  
This is especially true for business functions, which are as organizational departments - such as 
marketing, finance and accounting, human resources, R&D – that have idiosyncratic characteristics 
built around specific skills and occupational specializations. While the modularity of manufacturing 
activities has been largely analyzed within the industrial and management literature (e.g., Baldwin 
& Clark, 1997, 2000 and 2006; Gawer, & Phillips, 2013; Langlois, 2002; Langlois & Robertson, 
1992), there is only limited research on modularity of business functions, mainly in the context of 
knowledge intensive IT services (e.g., Miozzo & Grimshaw, 2005).  Business functions  are 
generally subject to a larger degree of intangibility in their output, compared to manufacturing 
physical products. This leads to increased uncertainty and opportunistic behavior by external actors, 
and therefore, stronger challenges for managing cross-border transfer (Ashok, Narula & Martinez-
Noya, 2014; Miles, 1993; Parida, Wincenta & Oghazid, 2016). A second peculiar characteristic of 
business functions is that they are produced and consumed simultaneously, implying that a service 
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product can often be identified with the service process itself, unlike manufacturing goods that are 
consumed after production (Bask, Lipponen, Rajahonka & Tinnilä, 2010; Voss & Hsuan, 2009). 
The simultaneity of production and consumption in business functions implies high probability of 
unintentional transfers of the knowledge content, which might result in a loss of competitive 
advantage. Therefore, companies’ offshoring knowledge intensive activities must adopt some 
safeguards measures in order to minimize the possibility of knowledge leakages (Parida, Wincenta 
& Oghazid, 2016).  
Additionally, the simultaneity of production and consumption in business services requires 
continuous interfacing between people to share information (Ashok, Narula, & Martinez-Noya, 
2014; Bask, Lipponen, Rajahonka & Tinnilä, 2010; Voss & Hsuan, 2009). In particular, knowledge-
intensive business functions require firms to act as knowledge brokers who interact with and 
transform knowledge of their clients and other knowledge holders (Tether & Tajar, 2008). This 
implies the need for greater interconnections (Den Hertog, 2000). The interdependencies between 
various actors are especially important when activities are more intangible and characterized by 
higher degree of tacitness (Narula, 2001, 2014). In other words, business functions activities are 
likely to require stronger interconnections than manufacturing activities. Therefore, the modularity 
of business functions not only requires disintegrating an activity into smaller modules, but also 
understanding the implications of doing so in terms of organizational architecture of the 
modularized activities.  
The literature has, indeed, identified two distinct dimensions of modularization. Sanchez 
(1999) distinguishes between the way in which a product or process is decomposed into individual 
functional components and the ways in which these functional components interact to provide 
overall functionalities of the system. Brusoni, Prencipe & Pavitt (2001) define a modular innovation 
as “a change in the core design concept of a component that does not affect its relationship with the 
others” and an architectural innovation as “a change in the relationships between a product’s 
components that leaves untouched the core design concepts of components”. Cabigiosu and 
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Camuffo (2012) and Furlan, Cabigiosu and Camuffo (2014) distinguish between component 
modularity, which refers to the extent to which a component performs a function and is connected 
to other components through open standard interfaces, and organizational modularity, which refers 
to the complexity, intensity and frequency of information sharing between two organizations. 
Similarly, Brusoni & Prencipe (2001) distinguish between product modularity and organizational 
modularization, while MacDuffie (2013) discriminates modularity-as-property from 
modularization-as-process: in both studies, the former concept identifies the possibility to frame a 
product, organization or network in different discrete modules, while the latter refers to the way 
through which these modules are organized based on their level of interdependence. Colfer & 
Baldwin (2016) refer to the first dimension of modularity as the technical architecture and to the 
second one as the organizational architecture. We build on this contribution because it relates more 
closely to the specific context of our study: business functions and organizational boundaries. In the 
following paragraphs, we discuss the relationship between these two dimensions of modularity 
within the context of business functions offshoring by elaborating on the “mirroring hypothesis”, 
i.e. the reasons why and the conditions under which firms align the technical and the organizational 
architectures of a business function when selecting the entry mode choice(Colfer & Baldwin, 2016).   
 
Entry mode and mirroring hypothesis: hypotheses development  
When a firm decides to offshore a business function and relocate abroad an activity currently 
carried out domestically, the selection of the entry mode, i.e. choosing between hierarchy (captive), 
market (outsourcing) or intermediate (such as alliances and joint ventures) solutions, remains one of 
the most challenging choices, because this decision might directly affect the performance of the 
offshoring venture (Brouthers, 2013).  
The make-or-buy-or-ally choice is traditionally explained by Transaction Costs Economics 
(TCE - Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). When market transactions are inefficient or non-feasible 
(e.g. due to asset-specificity, uncertainty, bounded rationality, information asymmetries, distance, 
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communication problems and lack of measurable outputs), firms tend to favor internal transactions 
(offshore in a fully owned, captive operation) rather than to rely on the market (e.g. international 
outsourcing). In these circumstances, suppliers are prone to opportunistic behavior and firms deploy 
substantial resources to negotiate and monitor the transaction to make sure that contract 
requirements are met, and to minimize knowledge leakages. As a consequence, firms are more 
likely to opt for internal solutions that minimize transactions costs (Williamson, 1975). TCE has 
been largely employed to explain also the specific entry mode decisions by MNCs (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1988 and 1989; Rugman, 1980 and 1986; Brouthers, 2002). Internalization 
Theory, in particular, builds on the assumption that firms invest abroad to exploit ownership 
advantages, which needs to be preserved against competitors. When companies rely on intangible 
and knowledge-intensive ownership advantages, transaction costs are high for external entry-modes 
(such as outsourcing), since knowledge leakages erode the advantage (Madhok, 1997; Narula and 
Martinez-Noya, 2015). In this case, firms are likely to opt for a hierarchical solution. When the 
ownership advantage depends on knowledge intensive and intangible assets that are less specific, 
transaction costs are lower and firms are more willing to adopt market solutions such as licensing 
and outsourcing (Cantwell and Narula, 2001, Buckley et al, 2017). Even within cooperative 
agreements, equity alliances are preferred over non-equity alliances in knowledge-intensive and 
intangible activities, as they allow a higher degree of control over the opportunistic behavior of the 
partner by aligning the incentives of both partners and by creating a high degree of interdependency 
and a mutual hostage position (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999; Mudambi and Tallman, 2010; Narula 
and Martinez-Noya, 2015). Internalization is, therefore, a decision about the degree to which firms 
collaborate with external companies (through either cooperative agreement or suppliers) (Narula 
and Verbeke 2015), and the choice of mode by which firms engage much broader than the 
dichotomous perspective often used by the mainstream IB literature (Benito, Petersen and Welch, 
2009; Chang, Chung and Moon, 2013).  
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More recently, scholars studying entry mode choice have built upon the Resource Based 
View (RBV) (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991 and 1996), which places greater emphasis on the value 
(rather than on the costs) of the activities that are offshored (Madhok, 1997 and 2002; Meyer, 
Wright and Pruthi, 2009; Mudambi and Tallman, 2010; Castañer, Mulotte, Garrette and Dussauge, 
2014). According to the RBV perspective, firms expand abroad through captive entry modes for 
two reasons.  First, a captive solution enables a more efficient exploitation of the competitive 
advantage by leveraging internal routines, including the transfer of knowledge between the parent 
and the subsidiary. Second, the wholly-owned solution provides the firm with greater strategic and 
operational control over foreign operations, thus reducing the risk of value erosion by third parties, 
especially when the competitive advantage is based on tacit and embedded components (Madhok, 
1997 and 2002; Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 2008). The Knowledge Based View (KBV), 
which is an extension of the RBV identifies knowledge as the most strategic resource, and suggests 
that the key challenge for an internationalizing firm is to facilitate the transfer of competences and 
manage the information flow within the organization. Indeed, MNEs must possess superior capacity 
for planning, contextual communication of information, and protection of knowledge compared to 
markets, and this makes the captive entry mode a better solution (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Arrow, 
1974; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Monteverde, 1995). Within the KBV context, Nickerson & Zenger 
(2004) state that activities that can be fully decomposable can be coordinated by the market, while 
interdependent activities are better managed within a single organization for knowledge process 
purposes.  
In our paper, we bridge these alternative and complementary theoretical perspectives by 
introducing the concept of modularity in the entry mode choice. Although these theories build on 
rather different arguments, they do agree that interdependent and synergetic activities are managed 
more efficiently when consolidated within a single firm than when distributed across companies 
(Baldwin, 2008; Baldwin & Clark 2000: Ch. 14; Langlois, 2002; Teece, 1996). Therefore, both 
theoretical perspectives agree that offshoring firms are expected to mirror the entry mode choice in 
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the technical architecture of the business function, by selecting a hierarchical entry mode if the 
activity is strongly interdependent with others, and a market-based entry mode if the activity is 
modular, i.e., if it is independent and can be outsourced without risking losing synergies among 
other activities.  
There are several reasons why a modular technical architecture is expected to lead to the 
mirroring of a market-based entry mode choice. Manufacturing industries can take advantage of the 
modular technical architecture of a product by exploiting common and standardized platforms that 
allow sharing components, thus increasing the opportunity of using market transactions and 
decreasing the costs to acquire inputs (MacDermott, Mudambi & Parente, 2013). Business functions 
can also benefit from a modular technical architecture. Indeed, the modularization of business 
functions offers the opportunity to reduce complexity, to learn more quickly and to adapt more 
rapidly to market and technology changes, thus reducing the costs, and increasing the effectiveness, 
of transferring knowledge across boundaries (Kotabe, Parente & Murray, 2007). Disintegrating the 
value chain of business functions into smaller, independent modules also reduces the exposure and 
leakage of proprietary knowledge to third parties (Gooris & Peeters, 2016), thus enabling value 
chain orchestrators to face lower transaction costs during the negotiating and monitoring phases, 
which in turn translates into a lower need for internalization. 
Furthermore, a modular technical architecture improves the strategic and operational 
flexibility of business functions, thus leading to higher efficiency in resource allocation, since it 
enables firms to exploit economies of scale and shift some modules to new product development 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Additionally, modularization increases firms’ opportunities to interact 
with different external suppliers for specific support functions and processes involving design, 
engineering, research and development, analytical processes, data processing, etc. These 
opportunities enable the client to exchange knowledge and expertise with each supplier, which in 
turns increases the scope of firm’s capabilities and innovation activity (Baldwin & Clark, 1997 and 
2000; Langlois & Robertson, 1992; Parente, Baack & Hahn, 2011).  
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In sum, modular technical architecture allows firms to: (i) reduce transaction costs, (ii) 
increase the efficiency of the internal resource allocation; (iii) increase the effectiveness of 
competence and knowledge transfer and sourcing across external companies; (iv) reduce knowledge 
leakages risks. This, in turns, implies that a company will be more likely to select an outsourcing 
solution when the technical architecture of the business functions is modular and therefore the 
organizational architecture in terms of entry mode choice will be less hierarchical, as suggested by 
the mirroring hypothesis. Conversely, a non-modular technical architecture is made of 
interdependent activities and faces high risk of loss of synergies in case of separation; therefore it 
will be more efficient to mirror a more hierarchical entry mode choice.  
Hence, we expect the following hypothesis to hold:  
 
Hypothesis 1: A modular (non- modular) technical architecture will mirror an outsourcing 
(captive) solution when offshoring a business function  
 
The level of disintegration and the mirroring hypothesis  
As discussed in the previous section, modularity enables the reduction of knowledge leakages 
risks and transaction costs, and this will imply the mirroring of an outsourcing solution in the entry 
mode choice. However, the disintegration of the value chain requires also strong efforts to 
reintegrate the modules into the system (Baldwin & Clark, 1997; Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005; 
Kotabe, Parente & Murray, 2007; Langlois & Robertson, 1992; Parente, Baack & Hahn, 2011). 
Here we argue that the intensity of the reintegration challenges can vary with the level of 
disintegration implemented by the company, i.e. the number of distinct micro-activities in which a 
given macro-activity can be meaningfully divided. Indeed, modularity has been defined as “an 
attribute of a complex system that advocated designing structures based on minimizing 
interdependence between modules and maximizing interdependences within them that can be mixed 
and matched in order to obtain new configurations without loss of system’s functionality or 
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performance” (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010: 259). Hence it becomes crucial to identify the 
“between” and “within” contingencies in order to understand the extent to which modularity can 
effectively decrease transaction costs and knowledge leakages risks consistently with the mirroring 
hypothesis. 
To this end, we rely on Gooris and Peeters (2016) to distinguish between two different levels of 
disintegration. On the one hand, firms can separate the value chain across different business 
functions (such as R&D, marketing and sales, call centers etc.). On the other hand, they can further 
stretch the level of disintegration of the value chain by adopting a “functional fine-slicing”, i.e. the 
separation of each business function into smaller, single tasks (such as the billing activity within the 
marketing and sales division).  
We propose that reintegration costs are potentially lower when the disintegration of the value 
chain with - rather than without – functional fine-slicing. Indeed, when fine-slicing and offshoring, 
companies need to coordinate and re-connect tasks that belong to the same function and that share a 
common platform in terms of routines, interfaces, business practices, etc. The opposite is true in 
case of offshoring without functional fine slicing, since each function relies on specializations and 
managerial practices that are different one from the others, thus raising higher reintegration costs.  
This challenge is exacerbated when one or more functions are outsourced, i.e. when more than one 
firm is involved (Lew et al., 2016), since in this case the platforms need to be reconnected not only 
across functions but also across firms. 
Accordingly, we argue that the extent to which the firm will comply with the mirroring 
hypothesis is contingent on the level of disintegration, and that firms implementing disintegration 
without functional fine-slicing will be much more concerned about the potential reintegration costs. 
In this case, modular technical architecture might not be sufficient to ensure an effective cost and 
risks reduction strategy when offshoring. Therefore, a firm will be more likely to select a 
hierarchical entry mode in order to internalize such costs and risks, even when the technical 
architecture of the business function is modular, thus “breaking” the mirroring hypothesis (Colfer & 
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Baldwin, 2016). Conversely, firms that implement functional fine-slicing when offshoring can align 
more easily entry mode choice and technical architecture of their activity, thus complying with the 
mirroring hypothesis. Therefore, we expect the following hypothesis to hold:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The probability that modular (non-modular) technical architecture will mirror 
an outsourcing (captive) solution is higher in case of offshoring with functional fine-slicing 
than without functional fine-slicing  
 
Company experience and the mirroring hypothesis   
We propose that the extent to which firms comply with the mirroring hypothesis is also 
contingent on the firms’ familiarity with offshoring. Firms with no offshoring experience are more 
likely to be unaware of the advantages arising from mirroring technical and organizational 
architectures. Additionally, firms that are new to offshoring are also likely to be less capable to face 
not only the reintegration efforts but also the so-called “hidden costs” of offshoring (Cacciatori & 
Jacobides, 2005; Larsen, Manning & Pedersen, 2013). The “hidden costs” are typically due either to 
external contingencies or factors that are internal to the company undertaking an offshoring 
initiative (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005; Larsen, Manning & Pedersen, 2013). External 
contingencies arise, for example, when firms discover that the local labor and resource costs inflate 
beyond initial estimations or that the local market is growing less than expected (Larsen, 2016). 
Internal factors may arise from managerial mistakes in planning and implementing the offshoring 
initiatives or from underestimating the efforts required to manage it and to reintegrate the module 
into the system. The main consequences of these unexpected challenges are: more intensive 
monitoring, higher coordination efforts, increased knowledge misappropriation, risks of 
undermining core competencies, performance shortcomings and, eventually, the reshoring or back-
shoring of the foreign initiative (Albertoni et al., 2017; Dibbern, Winkler & Heinz, 2008; Gooris & 
Peeters, 2016; Larsen, Manning & Pedersen, 2013; Reitzig & Wagner, 2010).  
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Therefore, inexperienced firms will be less likely to comply with the mirroring hypothesis, 
due to their lower awareness of the benefits arising from this strategy and due to their limited 
capability to plan, set up and manage the foreign venture, and underestimating the hidden and 
reintegration costs of offshoring. Conversely, experienced firms are expected to have learned from 
previous offshoring initiatives and be better positioned to consider the benefits of mirroring 
technical and organizational architectures when making offshoring decisions. Experienced firms 
will also be able to estimate more accurately most of the reintegration and hidden costs associated 
to offshoring and, in particular, to outsourcing, thus facing lower post-implementation efforts (see 
Asmussen, Larsen & Pedersen, 2016). Thus, they will be more confident to comply with the 
mirroring hypothesis than inexperienced firms.  Hence, our third hypothesis is:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The probability that modular (non-modular) technical architecture will 
mirror an outsourcing (captive) solution when offshoring a business function is larger when 
firms have at least one previous offshoring experience.  
 
Data and methodology 
The sample  
We test our hypotheses on a sample of 486 offshoring initiatives worldwide from 1964 to 2009. 
Data are provided by the Offshoring Research Network (ORN) and derive from a survey project 
launched in 2004 by the Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER) of 
Duke University in the United States, which has been collecting information at the level of the 
individual offshoring initiativei. Table 1 shows the business functions involved in the offshoring 
initiatives. Information Technology is the function mostly subject to offshoring, accounting for 96 
observations (19.80% of the sample), followed by Software Development (84 observations, 17.35% 
of the sample), Call Center and Customer Contact (69 observations, 14.08% of the sample), Finance 
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and Accounting (56 observations, 11.43% of the sample) and Engineering Services (44 
observations, 8.98% of the total).  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 2 displays the main home countries of the 486 offshoring initiatives. The United States 
account for 310 initiatives (63.67%), followed by The Netherlands with 87 initiatives (17.96%) and 
Switzerland with 25 initiatives (5.10 %).  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 3 shows the host countries of the offshoring initiatives. The most popular destination is 
India, which hosts 219 offshoring initiatives (45.10%), followed by China with 47 initiatives (9.8%) 
and the Philippines with 39 initiatives (7.96%).   
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE  
----------------------------------------------- 
 
The variables 
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable, Entry mode hierarchy, derives from the following 
question in the ORN survey: “What is the service delivery model currently used for this offshoring 
implementation?”  The possible answers were: “Outsourced to an international third party provider 
offshore”; “Outsourced to a local third party provider at the offshore location”; “Partnering/teaming 
arrangement e.g., joint ventures, strategic alliances, build-operate-transfer”; “Captive (i.e. fully 
owned subsidiary offshore undertakes the activity)”. We categorized the answers as Entry mode 
hierarchy=0 if companies answered “Outsourced to an international third party provider offshore” 
or “to a local third party provider at the offshore location”; Entry mode hierarchy=1 if the 
companies answered “Partnering/teaming arrangement e.g., joint ventures, strategic alliances, build-
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operate-transfer”; and Entry mode hierarchy=2 if companies answered “Captive (fully owned 
subsidiary offshore undertakes the activity)”. The categorization of the entry mode choice through a 
scale variable has been employed in the literature to account for the intensity of the commitment by 
firms engaging in foreign expansion (see, for instance, Basile, Giunta & Nugent, 2003). In our 
sample, 195 observations (corresponding to 40.1%) have been classified as captive, 16 observations 
(corresponding to 3.3%) as cooperative agreements, and 275 observations (corresponding to 56.6%) 
as outsourcing.  
 
Explanatory variables. The main explanatory variable is business functions modularity, which 
reflects the technical modularity of business functions. This is a scale variable whose lower values 
indicate interdependence among the modules, while high values indicate that modules are 
independent. The proxy variable is computed from the answers to the question in the ORN survey: 
“What is the importance of each of the following risks in considering offshoring this function?” in 
relation to the risk of “Loss of synergy across firm activities”. Given the original score (ranging 
from 1 to 5), we reverse-coded the values in order to obtain a proxy that associates a high score (i.e. 
-1) to low risk of losing synergy across firm activities, which happens in the case of low 
interdependence and high technical modularity, and a low score (i.e. -5) to high risk of losing 
synergy across firm activities, which occurs in the case of high interdependence and low technical 
modularity. By referring to the synergies among business activities (and the risk of losing them) our 
proxy captures the extent to which the focal business function is characterized and affected by 
technical modularity. Following our first hypothesis, we expect a negative relation between the 
dependent variable and the proxy of business function modularity, so that high business function 
modularity will mirror a lower probability to select an organizational architecture based on a 
hierarchical entry mode. The mean value of the business functions modularity variable is slightly 
higher when considering the observations with outsourcing entry mode than with captive entry 
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mode (-2.50 vs. -2.81, respectively), and the t-test confirms that the two means are statistically 
significantly different (p<0.01), thus providing some first evidence towards our Hypothesis 1.  
A second explanatory variable is functional fine-slicing, which was derived from the question in 
the ORN survey: “Does/did this implementation involve discrete tasks or entire processes?” This is 
operationalized as a binary variable taking a value of 1 when the company answers that the 
implementation involves one or more single tasks within a business function, and 0 when the 
company answers that the implementation involves the entire process, i.e. the whole business 
function. In our sample, 303 observations refer to offshoring initiatives that have been performed 
for discrete tasks (i.e. dummy variable =1) and the remaining 183 are about offshoring initiatives 
that involved the entire business process (i.e. dummy variable=0). We expect that functional fine-
slicing is negatively associated to the dependent variable, i.e. that less hierarchical entry modes are 
more likely in case of fine-slicing of business functions, as it reduces transaction costs and 
misappropriation risks (Gooris & Peeters, 2016). In our dataset outsourcing is more frequent than 
captive when firms offshore a single task (63.4% vs. 33.3% vs., respectively), while the opposite is 
true when they offshore the entire process (45.4 % vs. 51.4%, respectively). Following our second 
hypothesis, we expect that the mirroring hypothesis holds when within-function modularity takes 
value of 1. 
A third explanatory variable is Offshoring Experience, a binary variable taking value of 1 when 
the company undertaking offshoring has at least one previous offshoring activity and 0 if the 
company has no offshoring experience. This variable is computed from the ORN database. In our 
sample, 219 observations display no previous offshoring experience (binary variable=0), while 267 
observations display offshoring experience (binary variable=1). Outsourcing is selected more 
frequently by inexperienced than by experienced firms (63.9% vs. 50.6%, respectively), while the 
opposite is true for captive entry mode (33.3% vs. 45.7%, respectively). 
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Control variables. We include control variables that may affect the entry mode choice at firm-
level, country-level, initiative-level, industry-level and function-level, in order to better account for 
the complexity of the offshoring phenomenon, which is investigated at different levels of analysis 
(Hätönen & Eriksson, 2009; Oshri, Kotlarsky & Willcocks, 2015).  
About firm-level variables, we use Firm Size to control for the effect of firm dimension on entry 
mode choice, as large firms, which are normally endowed of more resources compared to smaller 
firms, are better positioned to select a captive entry mode, which requires higher resource 
commitment and is preferred for larger scale operations. The proxy is the natural logarithm of 
number of employees of the offshoring firm (data provided by the ORN survey). 
About country-level variables, following Brouthers (2002) and Elia, Caniato, Luzzini & 
Piscitello (2014), we also control for the market and institutional context of the host country, by 
employing four variables arising from a factor analysis that has been performed on different items 
provided by the World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) and the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) (see table 4 for details). Using data from multiple sources reduces the sample bias 
(e.g. common method bias) (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003)ii. The four variables 
are Host Political Stability, which accounts for the quality of the political infrastructures of the host 
country; Host Market Attractiveness, which reflects the potential market growth of host countries; 
Host Human Resources, which accounts for the amount of skilled labor available in the host 
country; Host Low Labor Costiii, which accounts for low cost of labor in the host countries. We 
expect that the probability to adopt a not hierarchical, market-oriented entry mode is larger when 
the availability of low labor cost is high, since in this case companies will take advantage of local 
service providers to outsource their activity and save on costs. Outsourcing will be more likely also 
when political stability is low, since a less hierarchical entry mode will limit the client companies’ 
risk in countries with weak and uncertain institutions, and enables them to disinvest quickly if 
needed. At the same time, we expect that the probability to adopt a more hierarchical entry mode is 
higher in case of high market attractiveness and in case of availability of skilled labor, since firms 
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will be better able to appropriate the rents arising from higher sales and from valuable resources if 
they have full control over their foreign activities. Therefore, we expect a negative correlation 
between the dependent variable and Low Labor Cost and a positive correlation with the other three 
host countries variables. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE  
----------------------------------------------- 
Since most of offshoring initiatives come from the United States, we also introduce the dummy 
variable Home USA to control whether US companies may drive the results on entry mode choice. 
 
About the initiative-level variables, we include Cultural Distance, which is computed by 
applying the Kogut & Singh (1988) index to the items provided by Hofstede (2001). Since cultural 
distance implies larger uncertainty and higher transaction costs, this variable is likely to increase the 
probability of adopting a captive entry mode, as suggested by Internalization theory and TCE. 
However, the company might also face the uncertainty arising from cultural distance through a risk 
reduction strategy, by adopting a lower control in their governance mode (Brouthers, 2002; Elia, 
Caniato, Luzzini and Piscitello, 2014). Hence, the impact of cultural distance is not predictable a 
priori.  We also control for the age of the initiative by creating a variable named Offshoring Age 
computed as the difference between the year 2011 (the most recent year when the survey has been 
released) and the year of the offshoring initiative. Finally, to account for the offshoring motivations 
that might affect the entry mode choice, we employ three variables reflecting the 
internationalization drivers identified by Dunning (1993), i.e. market-seeking investments, 
efficiency-seeking investments and strategic asset-seeking investmentsiv. We control for these 
different types of investments by employing three variables based on a Likert scale scoring from 1 
to 5 provided by the ORN survey. The variables derive from the answers to the question: “What is 
the importance of each of the following drivers in considering offshoring this function?”, being 
three possible answers “Access to new markets for products and services” (market-seeking), 
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“Enhancing efficiency through business process redesign” (efficiency-seeking) and “Access to 
qualified personnel offshore” (strategic asset seeking, i.e. human resources).  
With regard to the industry-level variable, we control for High Tech and Knowledge Intensive 
Industries, a binary variable taking value 1 if the industry of the offshoring company belongs to the 
categories “Knowledge Intensive Service Industries”, “Medium-High Tech Manufacturing 
Industries” and “High Tech Manufacturing Industries” according to the classification provided by 
Eurostat-OECD (2007). The variable takes value of 0 if the industry of the offshoring company 
belongs to the categories “Less Knowledge Intensive Service Industries”, “Medium-Low-Tech 
Manufacturing Industries”, “Low-Tech Manufacturing Industries” according to the above-
mentioned classificationv.  
Finally, about the function-level variables, we control for the propensity that some business 
activities may present towards a certain entry mode, through 9 dummy variables accounting for the  
different business functions displayed in Table 1 by using Software Development as benchmark. 
We expect that those business functions that are strategically crucial for the competitive advantage 
of the firm (such as R&D) are more likely to be subject to captive entry mode choice, as this 
solution should ensure a more effective transfer of the competitive advantage between 
organizational units located in different geographical area, as well as reducing transaction costs 
associated to high asset specificity and knowledge leakages risks.  
Table 5 provides a summary of the variables employed in our analysis together with the proxies 
and their sources.     
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE  
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Models and methodology 
 
To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate the following equation model:  
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Entry mode hierarchy
1  ii  business functions modularity 2i  functional fine-
slicing 3i  offshoring experience 4i controls ii     (1) 
 
where i identifies the offshoring initiative and i  the error term.  
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, which assess respectively the effect of within-function 
modularity and the effect of offshoring experience on the mirroring hypothesis, following Greene 
(2010) we split the sample and compared the coefficients across subsamples, rather than using the 
interaction coefficients (see Gooris & Peeters, 2016 for a similar recent application). According to 
Greene (2010), the estimation technique based on interaction in non-linear models (as also 
suggested by Norton et al., 2004) is “generally uninformative and sometimes contradictory and 
misleading”. Therefore, Greene (2010) recommends to address interaction effects through model 
design (which, as in Gooris & Peeters, 2016, comes from splitting the sample), rather than by 
estimating interaction coefficients at the analysis stage. 
Therefore, to test Hypothesis 2 we created two subsamples, the first one accounting for 
offshoring initiatives with functional fine-slicing (i.e. functional fine-slicing=1), the second one 
accounting for offshoring initiatives without functional fine-slicing (i.e. functional fine-slicing=0). 
We estimate the following equation model on each subsample:  
Entry mode hierarchy
1  ii  business functions modularity 2i  offshoring 
experience
4i controls ii          (2) 
   
We create two subsamples also to test Hypothesis 3, by identifying offshoring initiatives in 
experienced companies (when the variable Offshoring Experience is equal to 1) and offshoring 
initiatives in companies with no prior experience (when the variable Offshoring Experience is equal 
to 0). We estimate the following equation model on each subsample:  
Entry mode hierarchy
1  ii  business functions modularity 2i  functional fine-
slicing 3i  controls ii          (3) 
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Given the nature of the dependent variable, which quantifies hierarchical intensity into three 
values - 0 (corresponding to outsourcing), 1 (corresponding to intermediate entry modes, i.e., 
alliances and joint ventures), and 2 (fully owned, captive operations), we employed a robust 
Ordered Probit model (see Basile, Giunta & Nugent, 2003). Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics 
and the correlation matrix of the explicative variables included in the analysis.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE  
----------------------------------------------- 
Results 
Table 7 reports the results of the econometric analysis. Column (1) shows the results of the 
robust Ordered Probit applied to the full model, corresponding to Equation 1, while Columns 2a and 
2b shows the results of Equations (2) testing Hypothesis 2 and Columns 3a and 3b the results 
associated to Equation (3) and testing Hypothesis 3. The full model in Column 1 shows that 
business functions modularity displays a negative and significant effect on the dependent variable (-
0.117, p<0.05), thus supporting Hypothesis 1, according to which business functions with modular 
technical architecture are more likely to mirror more modular organizational architectures (i.e., 
outsourcing) when selecting the entry mode. Marginal effects (available upon request) confirm that 
outsourcing entry modes are more likely when business functions are modular. The opposite is true 
when considering captive initiatives. Conversely, hybrid entry modes do not seem to be 
significantly affected by the business function modularity.  
As expected, functional fine-slicing displays a negative sign (-0.569, p<0.01), thus confirming 
that fine-slicing reduces the need for hierarchical entry modes. Conversely, Offshoring experience 
displays a positive and significant effect (0.343, p<0.01), suggesting that experienced firms tend to 
prefer captive entry modes to outsourcing. Outsourcing is probably used by inexperienced firms as 
a first step to invest in a foreign country, consistently with the stage strategy suggested by the 
Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). This may also be due to the fact that more 
inexperienced firms are offshoring in more recent years, when more service providers have started 
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operations in low cost countries, which makes it easier to select outsourcing than in the past (e.g., 
Manning, Massini, Peeters & Lewin, 2012). Regarding the control variables, political stability, as 
expected, increases the probability of adopting a captive governance mode (p<0.10). Cultural 
distance displays a strong positive and significant (p<0.05) effect, suggesting that firms are more 
likely to adopt captive solutions to internalize transaction costs arising from uncertainty when 
cultural differences are large. Offshoring age presents a positive and significant coefficient (p<0.01) 
indicating that the probability to select a captive entry mode is higher for long standing offshoring 
initiatives, that is, older offshoring decisions prefer a captive mode, whereas more recent, shorter 
offshoring initiatives tend to make more use of external providers. Again, this may be due to the 
increased availability of service providers in the more recent years. Firms are more likely to adopt a 
captive solution also in case of market-seeking investments (p<0.01), as this type of entry mode 
enables internalizing the profits arising from sales in the host country. Finally, some of the most 
strategic business functions, which tend to be characterized by higher asset-specificity, show higher 
probability to adopt a captive governance mode, e.g., Finance and Accounting (p<0.05), Human 
Resources and R&D (p<0.10), which is consistent with these functions often being responsible for 
the main competitive advantage of the firm, and entailing higher transaction costs and risks of 
knowledge leakages.   
Columns 2a and 2b report the estimation of Equation 2 on the two subsamples of companies 
with and without functional fine-slicing, respectively. Results show that business functions 
modularity has a significant and negative effect on the dependent variable (-0.182, p<0.05) in the 
subsample with functional fine-slicing (column 2a), but not in the subsample without functional 
fine-slicing, thus confirming Hypothesis 2.  
Finally, Columns 3a and 3breport the results of Model 3 estimated in the two subsamples of 
experienced and inexperienced firms, respectively. The variable business functions modularity is 
significant only for experienced firms (-0.179, p<0.05), thus supporting hypothesis 3.  
----------------------------------------------- 
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Robustness checks and additional analyses  
 We ran additional models to test the robustness of our choices in terms of operationalization 
of variables and samples. Since the operationalization of the dependent variable, entry mode choice, 
includes an intermediate category which pools both equity (i.e. joint-ventures) and non-equity (i.e. 
strategic alliances) agreements, with the former being closer to the captive entry mode and the latter 
to outsourcing, the results of the Ordered Probit model might be biased by the presence of this hybrid 
intermediate group. Although this category only represents a small percentage of the total 
observations, we estimated three alternative Probit models for robustness: the first model includes 
only captive and outsourcing entry modes (corresponding to 470 observations); the second model 
pools the hybrid entry modes with the captive observations (as if they were all joint ventures), and 
the third model includes the hybrid entry modes in the outsourcing observations (as if they were all 
alliances). Results, which are available upon request, confirm that business functions modularity 
decreases the probability of adopting a captive entry mode in all the three Probit models. In addition, 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are fully confirmed.  
 Following the most recent literature, which suggests to investigate the effects of the cultural 
distance and institutional context on modularity (see, for instance, Lew et al., 2016), we carry out 
additional analyses in order to understand whether the mirroring hypothesis is subject to further 
contingencies. We created two additional pairs of subsamples. The first one distinguishes between 
offshoring initiatives located in high vs. low culturally distant host countries, by employing the mean 
of the variable Cultural Distance (i.e. 2.171) as threshold. The second one separates offshoring 
initiatives undertaken in countries with high vs. low political stability, by using the mean of the 
variable Host Political Stability (i.e. 23.786) as threshold.  
 The results of the Ordered Probit model, which are displayed in Table 8, suggests that the 
mirroring hypothesis is contingent on both cultural distance and political stability. The variable 
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Business functions modularity turns out to be negatively and significantly correlated with the 
dependent variable only when the cultural distance between the home and host country is low (p<0.05 
in column 2) and when the political stability of the host country is high (p<0.05 in column 3). 
Conversely, firms selecting the entry mode choice when offshoring in unstable and culturally distant 
countries seem to be less concerned about aligning the technical and organizational architectures.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Our paper develops theoretical arguments and provides empirical results adding nuances to the 
mirroring hypothesis in the selection of the entry mode choice when offshoring business functions. 
Specifically, we show that modular business functions mirror a less hierarchical entry mode, 
because modular technical architectures allow simultaneously decreasing the need for 
internalization and increasing the effectiveness of the knowledge sourcing strategy that often 
underlies business function offshoring. Conversely, business functions which are not modular tend 
to mirror a more hierarchical entry mode choice, in order to ensure lower transaction costs and 
higher protection of proprietary knowledge. We also show that the mirroring hypothesis is 
contingent upon the type of disintegration adopted in the offshoring venture and upon the firms’ 
experience. Finally, our post-hoc analysis shows that the mirroring hypothesis is contingent also on 
the cultural distance between the home and host country and on the political stability of the host 
country, implying that firms are more likely to align technical and organizational architecture in 
cultural close and political stable contexts.  
 
Contributions to the literature  
  Our paper provides a contribution to two streams of literature, i.e. the mirroring hypothesis 
in the organizational literature and the entry mode choice in the international business literature, by 
bridging their (complementary) theoretical perspectives. Our analysis shows that the challenges 
arising from a low level of disintegration of the value chain and from global sourcing inexperience 
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hinder the extent to which companies are willing or capable to align technical and organizational 
architectures. Companies offshoring an entire business function will be more focused on 
implementing strategies that decrease the potential reintegration costs arising from between-
functions disintegration. With regard to offshoring experience, firms are likely to be unaware of the 
potential benefits of the mirroring hypothesis and to be less capable of planning and implementing 
an effective offshoring strategy due to its hidden costs. Finally, the higher transaction costs and 
knowledge leakages risks associated to cultural distant and unstable countries also seem to reduce 
the effectiveness and the attractiveness of mirroring.  
As pertains the debate on entry mode choice in the international business literature we provide 
a contribution in several ways. First, we have combined different theoretical perspectives and 
explored the joint impact of TCE and RBV factors. Specifically, this paper highlights how the 
implications of these two different schools of thought can be combined under the umbrella of the 
mirroring hypothesis (Colfer & Baldwin, 2016), by proposing an alternative explanation to why 
firms select make or buy (Hätönen and Eriksson, 2009; Pereira and Malik, 2015). Second, we 
explicitly introduce the role of modularity to the analysis of entry mode choice. Third, this paper 
shows how strong synergies among activities induces firms to select captive solutions, and how 
different levels of disintegration imply different challenges in terms of reintegration costs of the 
modules due to heterogeneous routines, interfaces, business practices etc.. The paper provides 
evidence that also the entry mode choice is subject to contingencies such as firm-level (i.e. 
experience) and country-level (i.e. cultural distance and political context of the host country) 
variables.  
Finally, our paper provides a further element of novelty by applying the concept of modularity 
to the context of business functions. We believe that the implications of our paper can be extended 
beyond this specific context. Indeed, also manufacturing activities can be subject to strong 
transaction costs and knowledge leakages risks, even if they are more tangible and are not 
characterized by the simultaneous consumption and production as in the case of business functions, 
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and therefore, all the implication arising from the modularity and the mirroring hypothesis are likely 
to hold in other sectors. Hence, we believe that our results have some degree of generalizability as 
regards the contingencies of the mirroring hypothesis and the role of modularity in the entry mode 
choice also for activities different from business functions.  
 
 
Managerial implications  
Our study offers managerial implications. First, we show that firms tend to mirror the technical 
and the organizational architectures, by aligning (not-) modular business functions with the 
selection of (more) less hierarchical entry modes, an aspect that managers should take into account 
to better manage the offshoring venture. Additionally, we suggest that firms should focus their 
efforts on increasing modularization, if possible, in order to take advantage of the associated 
benefits in terms of lower transaction costs and knowledge leakages risk. In other words, a 
offshoring strategy should be matched with (or even better, preceded by) a modularization strategy 
based on codified interfaces, which allows outsourcing to a higher extent and at lower costs and 
risks than what would otherwise be possible. This in turn should have strong performance effects.  
Second, we alert firms about the contingent effect of the locus and level of disintegration, by 
suggesting greater attention be paid to the reintegration costs when offshoring an entire business 
function (rather than single tasks within a business function) before applying the mirroring strategy. 
We also alert inexperienced firms to the consequences of neglecting mirroring as a strategic 
dimension. We suggest that inexperienced firms should adopt strategies (e.g. implementing a due 
diligence activity or contacting consultancy companies) aimed at increasing their awareness and 
understanding of the relationship between business functions and firms’ boundaries and their ability 
to anticipate and absorb hidden and reintegration costs of offshoring, in order to take advantage of 
the benefits arising from mirroring the technical and organizational architectures at the time of their 
first offshoring initiative. Finally, we warn companies from the overestimation of the benefits 
arising from the mirroring hypothesis in culturally distant and politically unstable host countries.  
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Future developments  
Our study is not exempt from limitations. Future research should try to develop more accurate 
measures of technical architecture of the business functions, e.g. by developing metrics based on an 
objective assessment of its dimensions. Additionally, they should better investigate to what extent 
modularity is an exogenous characteristics of the business function or a choice made by the firms, 
in order to provide more insights on whether, when and how it is possible to implement a 
modularization strategy before internationalizing. Future studies should also try to introduce more 
fine-grained measures of the level of disintegration, e.g., by employing a more nuanced scale 
variable, instead of a binary variable, also in relation to its extent within the organization. Further 
contingencies affecting mirroring hypothesis might also be explored, such as the specific effect of 
different types of industries and different categories of functions. Finally, future studies should try 
to investigate intermediate entry mode choices in greater depth, such as equity and non-equity 
collaborations, by disentangling how the mirroring hypothesis apply to the decision of whether (and 
to what extent) to collaborate with external firms (Narula & Martínez‐Noya, 2015).  
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Tables  
Table 1: Business functions involved in the offshoring initiatives. 
 
Business Function Freq. % 
Software Development 84 17.35 
Call center and customer contact  69 14.08 
Design 17 3.47 
Engineering services 44 8.98 
Finance and accounting  56 11.43 
Human resources 12 2.45 
Information technology 96 19.80 
Knowledge services 30 6.53 
Legal services 3 0.61 
Marketing and sales  27 5.51 
Procurement 27 5.51 
Research and development 13 2.65 
Other* 8 1.63 
Total 486 100 
* A small number of respondents have not been able to find a match between the offshored function and the ones 
proposed in the questionnaire 
 
 
Table 2: Home countries of the offshoring initiatives.  
 
Home countries Freq. % 
Australia 7 1.43 
Austria 1 0.20 
Denmark 10 2.04 
France 6 1.22 
India 1 0.20 
Ireland 1 0.20 
Japan 1 0.20 
Luxembourg 1 0.20 
Norway 4 0.82 
Spain 14 2.86 
Switzerland 25 5.10 
The Netherlands 87 17.96 
United Kingdom 18 3.88 
United States 310 63.67 
Total 486 100 
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Table 3: Host countries of the offshoring initiatives. 
 
Host countries  Freq. Percent 
India 219 45.1 
China 47 9.80 
Philippines 39 7.96 
Brazil 12 2.45 
Mexico 12 2.45 
Singapore 11 2.45 
Canada 11 2.24 
Czech Republic 9 1.84 
Argentina 8 1.63 
Costa Rica 8 1.63 
Malaysia 8 1.63 
Romania 8 1.63 
Russia 8 1.63 
Poland 7 1.43 
Germany 6 1.22 
Hungary 6 1.22 
United States 6 1.22 
Indonesia 5 1.02 
Sweden 5 1.02 
United Kingdom 5 1.02 
Italy 4 0.82 
South Africa 4 0.82 
France 3 0.61 
Norway 3 0.61 
Slovakia 3 0.61 
Australia 2 0.41 
Denmark 2 0.41 
El Salvador 2 0.41 
Finland 2 0.41 
Japan 2 0.41 
Luxembourg 2 0.41 
Pakistan 2 0.41 
Vietnam 2 0.41 
Other countries* 13 2.6 
Total 486 100 
 *Other countries include: Colombia, Ecuador, Estonia, Ireland, Jamaica, The Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay, each hosting only one initiative.  
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Table 4: Factor analysis for the host country variables   
First order construct Items Source Description Scale Loading Alpha 
Market Attractiveness 
Gross Domestic Product WCY Gross Domestic Product US$ billions 0.9864 
0.7939 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation WCY Inward Foreign direct investments US$ billions 0.9519 
Direct Investment Inflows Inward WCY Direct Investment Inflows Inward US$ billions 0.8724 
Government Consumption Expenditure WCY Government Consumption Expenditure US$ billions 0.9726 
Household Consumption Expenditure WCY Household Consumption Expenditure US$ billions 0.9698 
Political Stability 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism WGI 
Perception of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism. 
-2.5/2.5 0.8783 
0.9696 
Government Effectiveness 
WGI 
Perception of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government's commitment to such policies. 
-2.5/2.5 0.8556 
Regulatory Quality 
WGI 
Perception of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
-2.5/2.5 0.9011 
Rule of Law  
WGI 
Perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
-2.5/2.5 0.8859 
Control of Corruption 
WGI 
Perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
-2.5/2.5 0.8544 
Location Costs 
Remuneration Call Center Agent 
WCY 
Gross annual income including supplements such as bonuses - Call 
Center Agents 
US$ 0.7480 
0.7849 
Remuneration Manufacturing Worker 
WCY 
Total hourly compensation for manufacturing workers (wages + 
supplementary benefits) 
US$ 0.7606 
Remuneration Department Head 
WCY 
Gross annual income including supplements such as bonuses - 
Department Head 
US$ 0.7254 
Remuneration Personal Assistant 
WCY 
Gross annual income including supplements such as bonuses - Personal 
Assistant 
US$ 0.7622 
High Value-Added Resources 
Information Technology Skills 
WCY 
The extent to which the country can rely on information technology 
skills 
0/10 0.8036 
0.9237 
Qualified Engineers WCY The extent to which qualified engineers are available in labor market 0/10 0.9310 
Skilled Labor WCY The extent to which skilled labor is readily available in labor market 0/10 0.9000 
Note: The factor analysis has been performed on 60 countries. The items have been included in the factor analysis as the average value of the period 2004-2011. Higher values reflect better outcomes for all items. WCY stands 
for World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY), published by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) of Lausanne (http://www.imd.org/wcc/), while WGI stands for Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI), published by the World Bank (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp). 
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Table 5: Summary of the variables, proxies and sources employed in our analysis.  
Variable  Type of variable  Proxy Source 
Entry mode hierarchy  Dependent variable 
Variable ranging from 0 (Outsourcing) to 2 (Captive), being 1 cooperative agreements 
(e.g. joint ventures and alliances) 
ORN Survey - answer to the question: "What is the service delivery model 
currently used for this offshoring implementation?" 
Business functions 
modularity   
Explicative variable 
Variable ranging from -5 to -1, where the lower values (-5) reflect a high 
interdependence among the modules, while high values (-1) mean that modules are 
independent 
ORN Survey- Scores provided on a Likert scale to the risk "Loss of synergy 
across firm activities" in answering the question: "What is the importance of each 
of the following risks in considering offshoring this function?" (The proxy has 
been computed by taking the negative values of the scores) 
Functional fine-slicing Explicative variable 
Dummy variable taking value of 1 when the company offshores only a module of a 
business service, and 0 when the company offshores the whole business service 
ORN Survey - answer to the question: "Does/did this implementation involve 
discrete tasks or entire processes?" 
Offshoring Experience  Explicative variable 
Dummy variable taking value of 1 when the company undertaking offshoring has at 
least one previous offshoring experience, and zero if the company is inexperienced 
ORN Survey - our elaboration obtained by identifying companies with previous 
offshoring experiences in relation to the focal initiative.  
Firm Size Firm-level control variable Number of employees owned by the offshoring company ORN survey 
Host Political Stability Country-level control variable Score from a factor analysis Worldwide Governance Indicators (see table 4 for details) 
Host Market Attractiveness Country-level control variable Score from a factor analysis World Competitiveness Yearbook (see table 4 for details) 
Host Human Resources Country-level control variable Score from a factor analysis World Competitiveness Yearbook (see table 4 for details) 
Host Low Labor Cost Country-level control variable Score from a factor analysis World Competitiveness Yearbook (see table 4 for details) 
Home USA Country-level control variable Dummy taking value of 1 if the offshoring firm is from The United States ORN Survey 
Cultural Distance Initiative-level control variable Kogut and Singh (1988) index  Hofstede (2001) 
Offshoring Age Initiative -level control variable 
Difference between the year 2011 (year the survey has been released) and the year of 
the offshoring initiative 
ORN Survey  
Market-seeking Initiative -level control variable Variable on a Likert scale (ranging from 1 to 5) 
ORN survey - score provided to the driver “Access to new markets for products 
and services” as one of the possible answers to the question: “What is the 
importance of each of the following drivers in considering offshoring this 
function?” 
Efficiency-seeking Initiative -level control variable Variable on a Likert scale (ranging from 1 to 5) 
ORN survey - score provided to the driver “Enhancing efficiency through 
business process redesign” as one of the possible answers to the question: “What 
is the importance of each of the following drivers in considering offshoring this 
function?” 
Human-resource seeking  Initiative -level control variable Variable on a Likert scale (ranging from 1 to 5) 
ORN survey - score provided to the driver “Access to qualified personnel 
offshore” as one of the possible answers to the question: “What is the importance 
of each of the following drivers in considering offshoring this function?” 
High Tech and Knowledge 
Intensive Industries 
Industry-level control variable 
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the industry of the offshoring company belongs to 
the categories “Knowledge Intensive Service Industries”, “Medium-High Tech 
Manufacturing Industries” or “High Tech Manufacturing Industries”, and 0 if it belongs 
to the categories “Less Knowledge Intensive Service Industries”, “Medium-Low-Tech 
Manufacturing Industries”, and “Low-Tech Manufacturing Industries” 
OECD (2007). 
Function Dummies Function-level control variables A dummy for each offshored function ORN Survey  
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Table 6: Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics of the dependent and explicative variables 
 
Variable  1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 
1) Entry mode hierarchy  1.000                
2) Business functions modularity   -0.129 1.000               
3) Functional fine-slicing  -0.180 -0.072 1.000              
4) Offshoring Experience  0.132 -0.052 -0.038 1.000             
5) Firm Size -0.023 -0.126 -0.084 0.109 1.000            
6) Host Political Stability 0.165 -0.171 -0.072 0.067 -0.089 1.000           
7) Host Market Attractiveness -0.036 0.042 0.061 -0.056 -0.061 -0.259 1.000          
8) Host Human Resources -0.109 -0.028 -0.008 -0.093 0.303 0.064 0.056 1.000         
9) Host Low Labor Cost 0.046 -0.058 0.011 0.074 0.012 0.232 0.078 -0.014 1.000        
10) Home USA -0.119 -0.025 0.060 0.109 0.162 -0.034 0.132 0.230 -0.073 1.000       
11) Cultural Distance 0.055 0.076 -0.017 0.071 0.000 -0.277 -0.158 -0.251 -0.127 -0.187 1.000      
12) Offshoring Age 0.182 -0.004 -0.016 -0.125 -0.007 0.262 -0.060 -0.048 0.144 -0.216 -0.041 1.000     
13) Market-seeking 0.196 -0.196 0.172 0.063 -0.189 0.181 0.048 -0.228 0.067 -0.033 -0.064 0.225 1.000    
14) Efficiency-seeking 0.059 -0.231 0.057 0.103 0.131 0.090 -0.039 0.010 0.100 -0.074 -0.017 0.062 0.274 1.000   
15) Human-resource seeking  -0.056 -0.131 0.024 -0.138 -0.039 -0.006 0.097 -0.010 0.051 0.133 -0.083 -0.036 0.084 0.048 1.000  
16) 
High Tech and Knowledge 
Intensive Industries 
-0.076 -0.064 -0.113 -0.169 -0.126 -0.019 0.111 0.140 -0.083 0.273 -0.221 -0.251 -0.053 -0.143 0.254 1.000 
Observations 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
Mean 0.835 -2.646 0.623 0.549 8.608 23.786 40.700 44.189 26.270 0.638 2.171 7.451 2.444 3.189 3.626 0.710 
Std. Dev. 0.971 1.144 0.485 0.498 2.752 11.490 14.569 16.609 10.530 0.481 1.098 4.952 1.392 1.309 1.325 0.454 
Min 0.000 -5.000 0.000 0.000 0.693 4.000 4.000 3.000 2.000 0.000 0.020 2.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Max 2.000 -1.000 1.000 1.000 12.766 56.000 58.000 57.000 57.000 1.000 5.933 47.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 1.000 
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Table 7: Results of the robust Ordered Probit models (dependent variable: Entry mode hierarchy).  
Variables 
Model 1  Model 2a Model 2b  Model 3a Model 3b 
Full model  
With Functional  
Fine-slicing 
Without 
Functional  
Fine-slicing 
 With experience Without Experience 
Business functions modularity   -0.117** 
 
-0.182** -0.032 
 
-0.179** -0.051    
 (-2.06) 
 (-2.22) (-0.33)  (-2.25) (-0.56)    
Functional fine-slicing -0.569*** 
 - -  -0.474** -0.774*** 
 (-4.31) 
 
  
 (-2.57) (-3.76)    
Offshoring Experience  0.343*** 
 
0.408** 0.435** 
 -  -              
 (2.59) 
 
(2.21) (1.96) 
 
                
Firm Size -0.004  0.020 -0.044  -0.013 0.007    
 (-0.14) 
 (0.56) (-0.97)  (-0.32) (0.19)    
Host Political Stability 0.011*  0.011 0.013  0.008 0.008    
 (1.86) 
 
(1.33) (1.23) 
 
(1.02) (0.69)    
Host Market Attractiveness 0.003  0.001 0.008  -0.002 0.010    
 (0.60) 
 (0.15) (1.15)  (-0.35) (1.25)    
Host Human Resources -0.002  0.001 -0.005  -0.001 -0.002    
 (-0.52) 
 
(0.18) (-0.68) 
 
(-0.12) (-0.30)    
Host Low Labor Cost -0.001  0.005 -0.015  -0.000 -0.002    
 (-0.18) 
 (0.70) (-1.35)  (-0.04) (-0.20)    
Home USA -0.200  -0.124 -0.395*  -0.251 -0.172    
 (-1.36) 
 
(-0.58) (-1.66) 
 
(-1.13) (-0.75)    
Cultural Distance 0.120**  0.192** 0.019  0.173** 0.040    
 (2.08) 
 (2.31) (0.21)  (2.40) (0.36)    
Offshoring Age 0.041***  0.014 0.088***  0.052 0.029*   
 (2.70) 
 
(0.81) (2.87) 
 
(1.53) (1.84)    
Market-seeking 0.172***  0.222*** 0.187  0.152** 0.246*** 
 (3.31) 
 (3.34) (1.64)  (2.04) (3.09)    
Efficiency-seeking -0.053  -0.077 -0.042  -0.030 -0.062    
 (-1.00) 
 
(-0.98) (-0.51) 
 
(-0.39) (-0.72)    
Human-resource seeking  -0.021  -0.123* 0.098  -0.067 -0.061    
 (-0.41) 
 (-1.72) (1.01)  (-0.91) (-0.72)    
High Tech and Knowledge Intensive 
Industries 0.001 
 
-0.077 0.305 
 
0.222 -0.052    
 (0.00) 
 (-0.37) (1.16)  (0.99) (-0.22)    
Call center and customer contact  -0.126  0.166 -0.210  -0.279 -0.010    
 (-0.53) 
 
(0.53) (-0.53) 
 
(-0.84) (-0.03)    
Design -0.045  0.090 -0.139  -0.165 0.148    
 (-0.13) 
 (0.16) (-0.31)  (-0.36) (0.24)    
Engineering services 0.301  0.278 0.418  0.434 0.074    
 
(1.25) 
 
(0.94) (0.77) 
 
(1.14) (0.22)    
Finance and accounting 0.636**  0.790** 0.747*  0.301 1.030*** 
 (2.55)  (2.34) (1.72)  (0.82) (2.87)    
Human resources 0.831*  0.877* 0.822  0.377 1.250**  
 
(1.89) 
 
(1.68) (0.95) 
 
(0.58) (2.21)    
Information technology 0.161  0.105 0.572  0.160 0.040    
 (0.78)  (0.39) (1.42)  (0.48) (0.14)    
Knowledge services 0.128  -0.315 0.736  -0.174 0.427    
 
(0.43) 
 
(-0.68) (1.43) 
 
(-0.39) (0.98)    
Legal services -0.078  -4.340*** 5.449***  0.307 -4.532*** 
 (-0.10)  (-14.23) (10.96)  (0.36) (-9.60)    
Marketing and sales  0.349  0.397 -0.157  0.266 0.122    
 
(1.11) 
 
(1.14) (-0.22) 
 
(0.66) (0.20)    
Other -0.111  0.461 -0.041  -5.164*** 0.513    
 (-0.23)  (0.49) (-0.07)  (-11.80) (0.79)    
Procurement 0.199  0.098 0.814  -0.096 0.495    
 
(0.54) 
 
(0.22) (1.07) 
 
(-0.20) (0.75)    
Research and development 0.903*  1.488** 0.312  1.106 0.743    
 (1.95)  (2.39) (0.47)  (1.55) (1.17)    
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Constant Cut 1 1.362**  2.241*** 1.481*  1.005 1.091    
 
(2.55) 
 
(3.13) (1.68) 
 
(1.41) (1.16)    
Constant Cut 2 1.462***  2.350*** 1.582*  1.117 1.183    
 (2.74) 
 (3.27) (1.80)  (1.57) (1.26)    
No. of observations 486  303 183  267 219 
Chi Square 86.081*** 
 
927.129*** 441.571*** 
 
956.268*** 387.172*** 
Pseudo R-Square  0.125   0.155 0.150   0.130 0.160   
 
  Please note: * if p < 0.10, ** if p < 0.05; *** if p < 0.01. Z-statistics between brackets  
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Table 8: Results of the robust Ordered Probit models (dependent variable: Entry mode hierarchy).  
Variables 
  Column (1) Column (2)  Column (3) Column (4) 
 High Cultural distance  Low Cultural distance 
  
High Political Stability Low Political Stability 
Business functions modularity    -0.113 -0.164** -0.490** -0.074    
 
 (-1.19) (-2.14) (-2.29) (-1.19)    
Functional fine-slicing   -0.660*** -0.491*** -0.740 -0.543*** 
 
 (-2.99) (-2.73) (-1.63) (-3.61)    
Offshoring Experience   0.516** 0.248 2.028*** 0.131    
 
 (2.21) (1.37) (4.33) (0.83)    
Firm Size  0.065 -0.050 -0.038 0.021    
 
 (1.64) (-1.36) (-0.47) (0.70)    
Host Political Stability  0.011 0.012 -0.006 -0.041*   
 
 (1.09) (1.11) (-0.28) (-1.95)    
Host Market Attractiveness  0.009 -0.009 -0.002 0.011*   
 
 (1.31) (-1.11) (-0.13) (1.69)    
Host Human Resources  -0.004 0.005 -0.036*** 0.010    
 
 (-0.66) (0.55) (-3.45) (1.42)    
Host Low Labor Cost  -0.009 -0.005 -0.021 0.000    
 
 (-0.99) (-0.52) (-1.35) (0.03)    
Home USA  -0.325 -0.321 -0.466 -0.189    
 
 (-1.35) (-1.48) (-0.93) (-1.13)    
Cultural Distance  0.413*** 0.216 0.534*** 0.172*   
 
 (2.59) (1.00) (3.02) (1.87)    
Offshoring Age  0.016 0.069*** 0.381*** -0.004    
 
 (0.74) (2.85) (5.99) (-0.25)    
Market-seeking  0.219*** 0.157** 0.012 0.175*** 
 
 (2.58) (2.19) (0.06) (2.85)    
Efficiency-seeking  -0.044 -0.058 -0.383** -0.051    
 
 (-0.52) (-0.78) (-2.03) (-0.85)    
Human-resource seeking   0.088 -0.084 -0.017 0.033    
 
 (1.03) (-1.13) (-0.10) (0.53)    
High Tech and Knowledge Intensive 
Industries 
 
-0.250 0.225 0.564 -0.053    
 
 (-0.97) (1.07) (0.92) (-0.32)    
Call center and customer contact   -0.754** 0.306 -0.714 0.074    
 
 (-2.23) (0.88) (-1.03) (0.28)    
Design  -0.638 0.448 0.024 0.146    
 
 (-1.31) (0.84) (0.03) (0.38)    
Engineering services  -0.091 0.583 1.537* 0.193    
  (-0.23) (1.64) (1.81) (0.67)    
Finance and accounting  0.498 0.829** 0.900 0.756*** 
  (1.13) (2.52) (1.10) (2.72)    
Human resources  0.269 1.013* -2.082 1.233**  
  (0.28) (1.90) (-1.60) (2.54)    
Information technology  0.031 0.263 0.952 0.141    
  (0.09) (0.92) (1.48) (0.60)    
Knowledge services  0.369 0.244 1.486 -0.014    
  (0.70) (0.63) (1.63) (-0.04)    
Legal services  -0.029 -3.636*** 0.000 0.017    
  (-0.03) (-9.32) (.) (0.02)    
Marketing and sales   0.430 0.200 1.558 0.412    
  (0.78) (0.47) (1.59) (1.14)    
Other  -0.392 0.388 3.480*** -0.161    
  (-0.64) (0.51) (2.75) (-0.26)    
Procurement  -0.370 1.329** 0.918 0.315    
  (-0.76) (1.99) (0.79) (0.78)    
Research and development  0.361 1.284** -0.197 1.163**  
  (0.58) (2.07) (-0.23) (2.45)    
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Constant Cut 1  2.825*** 1.137 2.980* 1.403*   
 
 (2.79) (1.47) (1.76) (1.94)    
Constant Cut 2  3.010*** 1.183 3.227* 1.499**  
  (2.97) (1.53) (1.91) (2.07)    
No. of observations  205 281 107 379 
Chi Square  44.799** 521.770*** 1960.372*** 53.723*** 
Pseudo R-Square   0.158 0.181 0.537 0.102    
 
  Please note: * if p < 0.10, ** if p < 0.05; *** if p < 0.01. Z-statistics between brackets  
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Notes  
i The ORN counts 13 partner universities and business schools belonging to the following countries: Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, China, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Spain.  
ii As regards the Common Method Bias, it is worth noting that the variables employed in our analysis are located in 
different parts of the questionnaire and that anonymity has been guaranteed to respondents (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In 
addition, the Harman’s single factor test (Podsakoff et al., 2003) showed that the portion of total variance accounted for 
by each single factor is very limited, thus suggesting that common method bias is not a serious concern with our dataset. 
iii This variable has been reverse coded by giving the scores a negative sign, since the original items display high values 
when labor costs are high. By employing the variable with negative sign, we associate high scores to countries with low 
cost of labor.  
iv We do not consider the natural-resource seeking driver as the focus of our paper is on the offshoring of business 
services. 
v The OECD (2007) classifies as “Knowledge Intensive Services” the following industries: Water transport, Air 
transport, Post and telecommunications, Financial intermediation, Insurance and pension funding, Activities auxiliary to 
financial intermediation, Real estate activities, Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal 
and household goods, Computer and related activities, Research and development, Other business activities, Education, 
Health and social work, Recreational, cultural and sporting activities. The “High Tech Manufacturing Industries” are 
Aerospace, Computers, office machinery, Electronics-communications, Pharmaceuticals, Scientific instruments, while 
the “Medium-High tech industries” are Motor vehicles, Electrical machinery, Chemicals, Other transport equipment, 
Non-electrical machinery. The “Less Knowledge Intensive Service Industries” are: Sale, maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel, Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles, Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household 
goods Hotels and restaurants, Land transport; transport via pipelines, Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; 
activities of travel agencies, Public administration and defense; compulsory social security, Sewage and refuse disposal, 
sanitation and similar activities, Activities of membership organization n.e.c., Other service activities, Private 
households with employed persons, Extra-territorial organizations and bodies. Finally, the “Medium-Low Tech 
Manufacturing Industries” include: Rubber and plastic products, Shipbuilding, Other manufacturing, Non-ferrous 
metals, Non-metallic mineral products, Fabricated metal products, Petroleum refining, Ferrous metals; conversely, the 
“Low-tech manufacturing industries” are: Paper printing, Textile and clothing, Food, beverages, and tobacco, Wood and 
furniture.  
                                                 
